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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CRIMINAL LAW:
THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT AFFIRMS THE USE
OF "MIRANDA" RIGHTS BY POLICE TO DETERMINE
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF STATEMENTS MADE
DURING CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)
I. FACTS
On January 24, 1997, an individual robbed the First Virginia Bank
in Old Town, Alexandria, Virginia. t An eyewitness to the robbery saw
the individual exit the bank and get into a vehicle, which was later found
to be registered to Charles T. Dickerson of Takoma Park, Maryland.
2
After a few seconds, the robber was observed exiting the vehicle, placing
something into the trunk, and then entering the passenger side of the
vehicle. 3
Three days after the robbery, ten Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) agents and an Alexandria, Virginia, police detective went to the
home of Charles Dickerson where the vehicle used in the robbery was
located. 4 FBI Special Agent Chris Lawlor knocked on the door of
Dickerson's apartment and identified himself as an FBI agent. 5 Once
Dickerson opened the door Agent Lawlor informed him that they
were investigating a bank robbery. 6 Several agents then entered the
apartment.7
When asked by Agent Lawlor, Dickerson consented to voluntarily
accompany the agents to the FBI field office in Washington, D.C., for
questioning.8 He was not formally under arrest.9 Before leaving the
apartment, Dickerson retrieved a coat from his bedroom where a large
amount of cash was observed lying on the bed.lO Dickerson explained
1. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1999). The individual, who success-




4. Id. FBI Special Agent Christopher Lawlor had primary contact with Charles Dickerson, while
Detective Thomas Durkin of the Alexandria Police Department assisted in the investigation. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. Dickerson and the United States disagreed as to whether the agents had Dickerson's
permission to enter his apartment. Id.
8. Id. At a suppression hearing, Dickerson testified that he did not feel that he could refuse to
accompany the agents. Id. at 673 n.2.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 673.
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that the cash was his winnings from gambling in Atlantic City, New
Jersey. Dickerson refused to consent to a search of his apartment."
At the FBI field office, Special Agent Lawlor and Detective Thomas
Durkin of the Alexandria Police Department interviewed Dickerson.
12
During questioning, Dickerson denied any involvement in the Alexan-
dria, Virginia, robbery.13 Upon Dickerson's denial, Special Agent Law-
lor applied for and received a telephonic search warrant for Dickerson's
apartment. 14
After being informed of the impending search, Dickerson consent-
ed to give a statement implicating himself in a series of bank robberies,
including the one in Alexandria, Virginia, along with a person he identi-
fied as Jimmy Rochester, who had actually committed the robberies.
15
Following his statement, Dickerson was placed under arrest.
16
As a result of Dickerson's confession, Jimmy Rochester was arrested
and admitted that he was involved in nineteen robberies in three states. 17
He also admitted that Dickerson was his getaway driver in seven of the
robberies.' 8 The subsequent searches of Dickerson's apartment and
vehicle produced items used or taken in the robberies. 19
As a result of his statement and subsequent investigation, Charles
Dickerson was indicted by a federal grand jury. 20 The charges included
one count of conspiracy to commit bank robbery, three counts of bank
robbery, and three counts of using a firearm during, and in relation to, a
crime of violence.21
Based on his claim that he had confessed prior to being read his
Miranda rights, Dickerson filed a motion to suppress his statements and
11. id.
12. Id.
13. Id. Dickerson did admit that he had been in the area of the robbery when it had occurred
and that he had ran into an old friend who had asked him for a ride to Maryland, which Dickerson
agreed to provide for him. Id.
14. Id. at 673-74. To obtain the warrant from Judge James E. Kenkel, Special Agent Lawlor
informed him that the robber had used a pistol and a leather bag, that he had demanded unmarked
bills, and that he had fled the scene of the robbery in a vehicle that was registered to Charles Dicker-
son. Id. at 673. In addition, the judge was informed that Dickerson had over $550 in cash when they
contacted him at his apartment, that he had paid his back rent with a considerable amount of cash, and
that Dickerson himself admitted to being in the area of the robbery when it had occurred. Id.
15. Id. at 674.
16. Id.
17. Id. Rochester admitted to robbing eleven banks in Georgia, three banks in Virginia, four
banks in Maryland, and an armored car in Maryland. Id.
18. Id. Rochester indicated that Dickerson was the driver of the getaway car when he robbed
three banks in Virginia and four banks in Maryland. Id.
19. Id. In the apartment, agents found a silver semi-automatic pistol, dye-stained money, a pre-
recorded "bait bill" from another robbery, ammunition, masks, and latex gloves. Id. In Dickerson's






all evidence obtained. 22 In opposition to the motion, Special Agent
Lawlor testified at the suppression hearing that Dickerson was read his
Miranda rights prior to his confession. 23 In particular, Agent Lawlor
testified that Dickerson confessed a short time after he had obtained the
warrant to search Dickerson's apartment. 24
A discrepancy in Agent Lawlor's statement was discovered when the
advise-of-rights form indicated that Dickerson waived his rights at 9:41
p.m. while Agent Lawlor indicated on the search warrant that he received
the warrant at 8:50 p.m. 25 This indicates that Dickerson waived his rights
almost an hour after the warrant was issued, contrary to Agent Lawlor's
statement that Dickerson was given his Miranda rights "shortly" after
the warrant was received. 26 The district court found Dickerson's testi-
mony more credible and suppressed his statement, "finding that it was
made while he was in police custody, in response to police custody, in
response to police interrogation, and without the necessary Miranda
warnings." 27
Upon the district court's denial of a motion for reconsideration, the
Government filed an interlocutory appeal with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. 28 The Fourth Circuit, by a divided vote,
reversed the suppression order.29 It held that Miranda v. Arizona30 was
not a constitutional holding and that Dickerson's statement satisfied con-
gressional intent in 18 U.S.C. § 3501, which made statements admissible
if they were found to be given voluntarily.31 The Fourth Circuit also
recognized that the clear intent of § 3501 was to restore "voluntariness
as the test for admitting confessions in federal court."
32
22. Id. at 674-75. Dickerson moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of his
statement-the identification and subsequent confession of Jimmy Rochester-and the evidence
obtained from his apartment and vehicle. Id. at 674. Dickerson moved to suppress this evidence
based upon the claim that law enforcement failed to give him his Miranda warnings, which require
that before any custodial interrogation a suspect be informed of his or her rights to remain silent and to
the presence of an attorney. Id. at 675; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).





28. Id. at 677.
29. Id. at 695.
30. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
31. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695. Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501 in 1968 shortly after the
Miranda v. Arizona decision. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671. The statute provides that a federal judge,
when examining the admissibility of a custodial confession, shall determine the voluntariness of the
confession based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession. 18
U.S.C. § 3501 (1994). The presence or absence of any particular factors need not be conclusive as to
a determination of its voluntariness. Id.
32. Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 671.
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held, in a seven-to-two
decision, that Miranda and its progeny are constitutional decisions and,
as such, cannot be overruled by Congress. 33 By reversing the judgment
of the court of appeals, the Supreme Court affirmed the suppression of
Dickerson's statement. 34 As a constitutional decision, Miranda governs




The Fifth Amendment states, in part, that no person "shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." 36 The
Supreme Court has recognized that this fundamental right became an
integral part of our Constitution through many years of enduring
difficulties and persecution. 37 As a result, this right, among others, has
been secured "for ages to come, and . . . [is] designed to approach
immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it."38
Due to such a firmly rooted constitutional principle, the Court has
emphasized the necessity of procedures which will ensure that individu-
als are permitted to exercise their Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination. 39 The Court has promulgated the Miranda warnings
as being such a necessary procedure.40
A. HISTORY-ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS
In the eighteenth century, English common law recognized that con-
fessions obtained by threats or promises could not be used against a
defendant at trial. 4 1 If a defendant wished to voluntarily confess to the
crime, yet escape the requisite punishment, he could appeal to the Crown
for mercy under the Law of Approvement. 42 Under this law, a defendant
was required to show that he was not the principal offender while making
an honest and complete confession regarding the crime charged and any
other "treasons" and felonies of which he was also aware.43 A failure of
complete disclosure resulted in a sentence of death. 44 To be recognized
33. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (2000).
34. Id. at 2330, 2337.
35. Id. at 2329-30.
36. U.S. CONsT. amend. V, § 3.
37. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966).
38. Id. (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821)).
39. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.
40. Id. at 471.
41. The King v. Rudd, 168 Eng. Rep. 160, 161 (K.B. 1783).
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as truly voluntary, a confession had to be obtained by a person of
authority without using any type of inducement. 45 Induced confessions
were not presumed to be untrue, they were only considered dangerous to
the "due administration of justice." 46
In the later half of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court, in
Hopt v. Utah,47 recognized that a confession which was not given as a
result of inducements, threats, or promises was "freely and voluntarily
made." 48 The Court added that such a freely given confession was "of
the most satisfactory character." 49 Twelve years later, in Pierce v.
United States,50 the Court ruled that the presence of officers while a
defendant was in custody did not change the voluntariness of the confes-
sion, as long as it was not "extorted by inducements or threats."51
One year after the Pierce decision, the Court in Brain v. United
States,52 first recognized the Fifth Amendment as a constitutional basis
for voluntary confessions. 53 The Court recognized that once an issue is
raised at a criminal trial as to the voluntariness of a defendant's confes-
sion that issue is determined by the Fifth Amendment, which commands
that no person shall be forced to incriminate himself or herself. 54 The
Court explained that the language of the Fifth Amendment was "but a
crystallization" of the voluntariness standard found under common
law.55
In 1936, in Brown v. Mississippi,56 the Court recognized a second
constitutional basis for voluntary confessions: the Due Process Clause of
45. Regina v. Baldry, 169 Eng. Rep. 568, 569 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1852).
46. Id.
47. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
48. Id. at 584. Upon the arrest of Hopt for murder at a local railroad yard, Hopt was immediate-
ly removed from a large angry crowd, which had gathered to witness the arrest. Id. Two or three
minutes after his arrest, while he was being escorted to jail and away from the angry crowd, Hopt
confessed to the murder. Id. The angry crowd included the father of the murder victim who was said
to have made a motion to draw his revolver but was prevented from doing so by the arresting officer.
Id.
49. Id.
50. 160 U.S. 355 (1896).
51. Id. at 357. Two defendants, convicted of murder, argued that a confession given while they
were under arrest and handcuffed amounted to an inducement. Id.
52. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
53. Id. at 542. In Brain, the defendant, who was the first mate on a ship sailing from Boston to
South America, was placed in custody after the ship's captain and two others were murdered. Id. at
535-36. After pulling into Halifax, Nova Scotia, the defendant was taken to the police department
where the police, prior to being contacted by the United States consul, interviewed him. Id. at 536-37.
During questioning, the defendant denied guilt. Id. at 539. The defendant's conversation with police
was offered as a confession at his subsequent trial. Id. at 540. At trial, defense counsel objected to
the admission of the defendant's conversation by arguing that the conversation occurred while the
defendant was in police custody and that it was not voluntary. Id. at 539. The objection was denied.
Id.
54. Id. at 542 (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. V).
55. Id. at 543.
56. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
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the Fourteenth Amendment. 57 The Supreme Court stated that any state
action, regardless of the agency, must comply with the fundamental prin-
ciples of liberty and justice.58 The Court recognized that a trial based
upon a confession that was obtained as a result of physical coercion is
only a "mere pretense." 59 The Court went on to rule that confessions
obtained by physical coercion are a clear violation of the Due Process
Clause.60
Starting in 1940, the due process voluntariness test became the stan-
dard by which confessions were measured.61 In Chambers v. Florida,62
the Court applied the standards of due process when it addressed the
prolonged interrogation of the petitioners. 63 Such use of compulsive
confessions was viewed by the Court as a denial of "due process of law
as guaranteed in the Fourteenth Amendment." 64 The Court added that
to allow confessions to be obtained in this manner would turn the due
process requirement into a "meaningless symbol." 65
Four years later in Ashcraft v. Tennessee,66 the Court held that
the nonstop questioning of a suspect, without benefit of communication
or rest for thirty-six hours, was also a violation of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 67 In 1963, the Court, in Haynes v.
57. Id. at 285-87. In Brown, law enforcement officials tortured three young black men, who
were suspected of murdering another man, until they agreed to confess to the crime. Id. at 281-82.
The first defendant was hanged by a rope, let down before losing consciousness, and then whipped
until he finally confessed. Id. The other two defendants were made to strip and then forced over the
back of chairs where they were whipped with a leather strap until they confessed. Id. The Court, in
commenting on the methods used to obtain the confessions, stated that they could not imagine any
methods more offensive than those used on these petitioners. Id. at 286.
58. Id. at 286 (quoting Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)).
59. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286.
60. Id. at 286-87.
61. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 684 (4th Cir. 1999).
62. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
63. Id. In response to the murder of an elderly white man, the county sheriff took approximately
forty black citizens of Pompano, Florida, into custody where they were questioned for seven days. Id.
at 230. The three petitioners in this case were subjected to interrogation for five days, which
culminated in an all night interrogation resulting in the confessions. Id. at 231. During the week that
the petitioners were interrogated, they were not permitted to speak with friends, relatives, or an
attorney. Id. When questioned in jail, they usually found themselves surrounded by four to ten men
consisting of the sheriff, deputies, jailers, and private citizens. Id.
64. Id. at 228.
65. d. at 240.
66. 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
67. Id. at 153-54. Ashcraft was charged with hiring another man to kill his wife. Id. at 144.
There was a dispute as to whether Ashcraft actually confessed to the crime. Id. at 151. The officers
who interrogated Ashcraft claimed that after 28 hours of constant questioning, Ashcraft named a
young black man, whom he had occasionally given a ride to work, as the possible killer. Id. Once
found and questioned, this young black man stated that Ashcraft had hired him to kill Ashcraft's wife,
which he did. Id. According to the officers, when Ashcraft was confronted with this information he
made a self-incriminating statement but refused to sign the transcript of his statement. Id. Ashcraft
denied ever making the statement. Id.
[VOL. 77:153
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Washington,68 again ruled as a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
confession obtained after a sixteen-hour interrogation. 69 The Court also
indicated that in order to determine if a confession was coerced, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the "totality of the circum-
stances" surrounding the confession must be examined. 70
In the 1964 decision of Malloy v. Hogan,71 the Court made it clear
that the Fifth Amendment's Incrimination Clause was incorporated into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 72 In recognition
of its holding in Bram, the Court indicated that when examining a con-
fession in light of constitutional concerns regarding the right against
self-incrimination, the inquiry was not the conduct of law enforcement
in obtaining the confession but rather whether the obtained confession
was "free and voluntary." 73 In other words, a confession cannot be
obtained as a result of any threats, promises, or improper influences,
regardless of how slight those influences may tend to be. 74
The Court stated that this change to the federal standard in state
cases recognized that the American system of criminal prosecution in-
volves unhindered parties presenting their arguments before an impartial
decision-maker rather than an inquisitorial system where the decision-
maker defines the scope and extent of inquiry.75 As a result, both feder-
al and state governments were constitutionally required to determine the
guilt of an accused by independently obtained evidence and not simply
from coerced statements coming from the mouth of the accused. 76
In a decision made on the heels of Malloy, the Court in Escobedo v.
Illinois77 held that a person who is the "focus" of a police interrogation
should be guaranteed his or her rights under a constitutional privilege.78
68. 373 U.S. 503 (1963).
69. Id. at 504. During this time Haynes, who was suspected of committing a robbery, was kept
incommunicado until he made a written statement. Id. at 514.
70. Id. In Haynes, the suspect was not permitted to contact his wife or an attorney until he
confessed, even though law enforcement had possession of sufficient evidence to charge him with the
crime. Id. at 510. It was not until he was in custody for approximately five to seven days that the
petitioner was first allowed to contact his wife. Id. at 511.
71. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
72. Id. at 6. Malloy, who had pled guilty to gambling, was ordered by the county's superior court
to testify at an inquiry into gambling and other related criminal activity being conducted in the county.
Id. at 3. Malloy refused to testify invoking the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination.
Id. The county superior court held him in contempt and ordered him to jail until he agreed to answer
the questions. Id. The Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors affirmed the decision. Id.
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 13.
76. Id. at 7-8.
77. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
78. Id. at 490-92. In Escobedo, the petitioner was taken into custody and transported to the po-
lice department where he was questioned about a homicide. Id. at 479. During questioning, petitioner
requested to speak with his attorney but was denied. Id. at 481. In addition, petitioner's attorney, who
2001]
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The Court held that when the police begin to focus on a particular
suspect, take him into custody, proceed with interrogations, and deny
requests for the presence of an attorney, the suspect's constitutional privi-
leges have been violated. 79 Statements taken during that time may not
be used against the suspect at a criminal trial.8 0 The Court reasoned that
when the law enforcement function changes from investigatory to accusa-
tory, the adversary system begins to operate and requires the acces-
sibility, by the accused, to established constitutional privileges.8 1 The
Court also reasoned that the American criminal justice system should not
depend, for its effectiveness, on keeping its citizens ignorant of their
constitutional rights.82
B. MRANDA V. ARIZONA
Two years later, in the landmark decision Miranda v. Arizona, the
Court stated that it was necessary to establish certain procedural safe-
guards to ensure that individuals, who were in police custody and subject
to an interrogation, be accorded their Fifth Amendment privilege not to
incriminate themselves.8 3 These procedural safeguards have become
commonly known as the "Miranda rights." 84
In Miranda, the Court first recognized that the history of in-custody
interrogation was plagued with physical brutality at the hands of the
police. 85 The Miranda Court recognized that although such brutality
had become the exception, limitations had to be made to ensure that
such practices would forever be eliminated.8 6 In addition to the use of
physical force, it was recognized that in-custody statements may also
be obtained by interrogation techniques which are psychological in
nature and thus, coercive. 87 To support this conclusion, the Court made
reference to several police texts, which demonstrated that then-present
police practices employed the use of psychological techniques in the
was informed of his client's predicament, responded to the police department where he requested to
speak to the petitioner. Id. at 480. The police told him that he could not speak with his client until they
finished questioning him. Id.
79. Id. at 490-91.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 492.
82. Id. at 490.
83. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 445-47; see also IV NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT,
REPORT ON LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 4 (1931). In its 1931 report, the Commission concluded
that beatings and other forms of cruelty were used by a vast number of police agencies to obtain
confessions from suspects. Id. In 1961 it was again reported that some police officers were still
relying on physical brutality to obtain confessions. COMMISSION ON CIVIL Rimrrs REPORT, JUSTICE 17
(1961).
86. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 447.
87. Id. at 448.
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interrogation process.88 Due to the potential for physical and psycho-
logical abuse, the Court stated that the custodial interrogation itself
"exact[ed] a heavy toll on individual liberty and trade[d] on the
weaknesses of individuals." 89
The Miranda Court stated that it had always demanded a high
standard of proof to show that an individual had waived a constitutional
right and that this standard applied to in-custody interrogations. 90 In
order to protect those in-custody rights, the Court concluded that, in the
absence of a fully effective equivalent, it was necessary to provide indi-
viduals with required warnings and a subsequent waiver before any state-
ment would be deemed admissible.9' These four warnings, which were
required to be given prior to questioning, were: (1) the suspect has the
right to remain silent, (2) any statement the suspect makes may be used
against the suspect, (3) the suspect has the right to the presence of an
attorney during questioning, and (4) an attorney will be provided for the
suspect if the suspect cannot afford one.92
Even though the Court required the use of such warnings by police
prior to questioning, it emphasized that it was not its intention to hinder
law enforcement in the traditional function of investigating crime. 93 The
Court specified that confessions are a vital part of a criminal investiga-
tion and that any statements, given freely and voluntarily without com-
pulsion, are admissible as evidence. 94 The Court concluded that "volun-
teer statements of any kind are not barred by the Fifth Amendment and
their admissibility is not affected by our holding today." 95
The Court did add that in lieu of the warnings, Congress and the
states were free to search for potential alternatives for protecting the con-
stitutional privilege of those subject to in-custody interrogations. 96 The
Court qualified that statement by insisting that if other procedures were
88. Id. at 449 n.9; see also FRED EDWARD INBAU & JoHN E. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND
COINFESSIONS (1986) and CHALES E. O'HARA, F uNDmNrrA.s OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATON (1956) (giving
examples of psychological techniques that included seating arrangements in the interrogation room,
simplicity of the room to minimize distracting influences, proximity of the suspect to the interrogator,
effective personality of the interrogator, and perseverance).
89. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455. To illustrate such exploitation of the weak, the Court made
reference to several confession cases including one involving a heroin addict the Court described as a
"near mental defective" and another where a woman confessed in order to prevent her children from
being taken away. Id. at 456 (citing Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 297, 303 (1963); Lynumn v.
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 531 (1963)).
90. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475; see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (stating that
fundamental rights are presumed not to be waived).
91. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
92. Id. at 444.
93. Id. at 477.
94. Id. at 478.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 467.
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developed, they must be "at least as effective" as the prescribed
warnings in apprising suspects of their right of silence.
97
In the first of three dissents, Justice Clark stated that he would follow
the rule established in Haynes, which looked at the totality of the cir-
cumstances in order to determine if a statement is voluntary.98 Under
this rule the state would have the burden to prove that a statement had
been clearly voluntary when the necessary warnings had not been
given. 99 Justice Clark reasoned that the Fifth Amendment, on which the
Court rested its holding, was more arbitrary than the Due Process
Clause, which was more effective in protecting individuals in police
custody.OO He reasoned that there was "no significant support" in
prior cases for the Court to hold that the Fifth Amendment prohibited
custodial interrogations. 101
In the second dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the new rules
established by the Court were not designed to prevent police mis-
conduct.102 Instead, these rules actually discouraged confessions by rein-
forcing the resolve of the suspect. 103 This would result in the frustration
of an effective tool of law enforcement in obtaining confessions, which
had been recognized as an important aspect of crime control.104
Justice Harlan added that in establishing these rules, the Court was
doing nothing more than a hazardous experiment, which placed soci-
ety's welfare at risk.105 He also recognized, as did Justice Clark, that the
Due Process Clause provided ample protection for those who provided
confessions to police.106
In the third and final dissent, Justice White argued that the Court's
holding was not suggested by the Fifth Amendment nor did it have any
support in English or American history; rather it was a direct departure
from precedent.107 In short, Justice White argued the Court had made
new law, which had as its foundation a deep distrust for all confes-
sions.108 As a result, there inevitably would be occasions when this new
law would return a criminal into society, even those who had been
97. Id.
98. Id. at 502 (Clark, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 503.
100. Id.
101. Id. at n.4.
102. Id. at 505 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart and Justice White joined Justice Harlan in
the second dissent. Id. at 504.
103. Id. at 505.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 517.
106. Id. at 505.
107. Id. at 528-31 (White, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan and Justice Stewart joined Justice White
in the third dissent. Id. at 526.
108. Id. at 531,537.
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involved in serious criminal behavior. 109 It would also frustrate the
effectiveness of police investigation and apprehension."l0 Justice White
concluded that if it was necessary to place more controls on police
interrogations, there needed to be an approach that was more flexible
and not so much of a constitutional straightjacket as the Court's ruling
would prove itself to be.111
C. POST-MIRANDA
In the years following the Miranda decision, both Congress and the
Court attempted to qualify Miranda's dictates.11 2 Congress, by enacting
18 U.S.C. § 3501, made an attempt to return to the totality of the circum-
stances test. 113 The Court, on the other hand, limited Miranda's exclu-
sionary rule by allowing certain exceptions."l 4
1. The Enactment of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 as an Attempt to
Modify Miranda
Two years after the Miranda decision, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 as part of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of
1968.115 The Senate Judiciary Committee, which conducted extensive
hearings on Miranda, found that the inflexible requirements of Miranda
were unreasonable and harmful to law enforcement. 116 The Committee
also revealed that incidents of police brutality, which were the basis for
the Miranda decision, were not an accurate representation of current
police activity and that incidents of coercion were "isolated" and
definitely not the norm. 117 The Committee concluded that the Court
overreacted to reports of widespread brutality when it established its
holding in Miranda; thus "voluntariness" should be the determining
factor of whether a custodial confession is admitted as evidence in
federal court. 1 18
Congress agreed with the Committee's view and enacted § 3501
which states, in part, that "[i]n any criminal prosecution ... a confession
• . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given."119 The
109. Id. at 544.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 545.
112. See discussion infra Part 1I.C.1-2.
113. See discussion infra Part II.C.1.
114. See discussion infra Part II.C.2.
115. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 210 (1968) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994)).
116. Brief for the Maricopa County Attorney's Office as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance
at 5-6, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
117. Id. at 6-7.
118. Id. at 7.
119. 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994).
2001]
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statute specifies that a trial judge shall determine if a confession is
voluntary.120 In making this determination, a judge shall take into con-
sideration all of the circumstances surrounding the confession, including
time elapsed between arrest and arraignment, whether the defendant
knew the nature of the offense, whether the defendant was advised or
knew that he did not have to make a statement and that any statement
could be used against him, whether the defendant was advised of his
right to counsel, and whether the defendant was without assistance of
counsel when questioned. 121 The statute adds that "[tihe presence or ab-
sence of any of the above-mentioned factors ... need not be conclusive
on the issue of voluntariness of the confession."1 22
To opponents of the Miranda decision, the purpose of § 3501 was
to modify Miranda's overprotective exclusionary rule. 123 These oppo-
nents viewed Miranda as excessive because it resulted in the exclusion of
voluntary confessions. 124 They reasoned that because Miranda's exclu-
sionary rule extended well beyond the Fifth Amendment's restriction on
coerced statements, it was up to Congress to fashion a rule which retained
the benefits of Miranda but kept its provisions within the dictates of the
Fifth Amendment. 125
The Executive Branch regarded § 3501 as unconstitutional, and
refused to enforce it. 126 In 1994, in Davis v. United States,127 Justice
Scalia recognized this reluctance of the government.128 He stated that
§ 3501 would be considered when another case, which fit within the
terms addressed by that statute, came before the Court, regardless of
whether the government raised the issue or not.129 That opportunity
arose when Dickerson came to the attention of the courts with the
assistance of Professor Paul G. Cassell, court-appointed amicus curiae. 130
120. Brief for Maricopa Attorney's Office at 7, Dickerson (No. 99-5525).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 13, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000) (No. 99-5525).
124. Id. at 2.
125. Id. at 2-3.
126. Brief for Petitioner at 10, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
127. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
128. Id. at 463-64.
129. Id. at 464.
130. United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999). Professor Paul G. Cassel, Univer-
sity of Utah College of Law, is an avid opponent of the Miranda decision and has written numerous
articles on the issue. E.g., Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs: The Grand Illusion of Miranda's
Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084 (1996); Paul G. Cassell, The Costs of the Miranda Mandate: A
Lesson in the Dangers of Inflexible, "Prophylactic" Supreme Court Inventions, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 299
(1996); Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on
Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell,
Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387 (1996); Paul G. Cassell &
Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43
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To proponents of Miranda, the "effect" of § 3501 was a return to the
totality of the circumstances test to determine voluntariness, even though
Miranda rejected that test.131 They argued that § 3501 did not provide
sufficient safeguards at the outset of the police interrogation. 132 In addi-
tion, it did not require the police to exercise any affirmative obligation to
ensure that an obtained statement was truly voluntary.133 Therefore, ac-
cording to Miranda's proponents, § 3501 was in direct conflict with the
core holding of Miranda, which required that suspects be advised of
their rights and that any decision of a suspect to use those rights be fully
honored.134
2. Exceptions to Miranda
Since the Miranda decision, the Court has recognized certain excep-
tions to what in essence has become known as the Miranda "exclusion-
ary rule." 135 The first exception was created in the 1971 case of Harris
v. New York,136 in which the Court held that statements taken in technical
violation of Miranda may be used to impeach a defendant's creditibility,
if he or she takes the witness stand during trial. 137 The Court reasoned
that there was no constitutional protection for perjury.138 In line with the
Harris decision was Oregon v. Hass,139 where the Court found that the
shield provided by Miranda was not to be used as protection against
inconsistent testimony. 140
In Michigan v. Tucker, 141 the Court developed a second exception
to the Miranda exclusionary rule. 142 In Tucker, the Court determined
that the discovery of a witness from a statement given by a defendant
after he was not fully advised of the Miranda warnings did not violate
UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996).
131. Petitioner's Brief at 28, Dickerson (No. 99-5525).
132. Id. at 29.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 28.
135. Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 13, Dickerson (No. 99-5525).
136. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
137. Id. at 226. A "technical violation" of Miranda is where the police obtain an in-custody state-
ment from a suspect without providing all of the requisite Miranda warnings prior to taking the state-
ment. Id. at 222 (citing Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954)). Such a violation renders the
statement inadmissible in the prosecution's cas-in-chief. Id. at 222.
138. Id. at 225.
139. 420 U.S. 714 (1975).
140. Id. at 722. Hass had been arrested for theft and then advised of his Miranda rights. Id. at
715. While he was being transported in a police vehicle, he informed the arresting officer that he
wanted to speak to an attorney. Id. The officer told Hass that one would be contacted upon their
arrival at the police station. Id. at 715-16. Prior to arriving at the station, Hass provided inculpatory
information. Id. at 716. Even though this inculpatory information was excluded from the prosecutor's
case-in-chief, the Court indicated that such information could be used against a defendant for
impeachment purposes. Id. at 721-22.
141. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
142. Id.
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the Constitution.143 The Court reasoned that when balancing the inter-
ests of the defendant with that of society, it must factor in the strong
interest of making available all relevant and trustworthy evidence to the
trier of fact. 144 The Court also stated that the conduct of the police did
not curtail the respondent's privilege against self-incrimination but
"departed only from the prophylactic standards later laid down by this
Court in Miranda to safeguard that privilege."1 45
A third exception was found in the 1984 case of New York v.
Quarles.146 The Court held that there is a "public safety" exception to
the Miranda requirement that a suspect be advised of his rights before a
statement may be admitted as evidence. 147 The Court also held that the
exception does not depend upon the motivation of the officer.14 8 In
creating the public safety exception, the Court relied on the findings in
Tucker that the "prophylactic Miranda warnings ... are 'not themselves
rights protected by the Constitution."'1 49
A fourth exception was developed in Oregon v. Elstad,150 where the
Court held that an initial failure to advise a suspect of his or her Miranda
warnings did not taint subsequent admissions after the warnings were
given and waived.151 The Court reasoned that when inquiring if a
second statement is made voluntarily, it must examine the police conduct
and surrounding circumstances of the statement. 152 The Court in Elstad
143. Id. at 450. While attempting to get medical assistance for a woman who had been bound
and raped in her home, the police observed a dog inside the victim's house. Id. at 435. Realizing that
the dog did not belong to the victim, the police followed the dog to Tucker's house. Id. at 436. Prior to
interrogation, the police advised Tucker of his rights but failed to advise him that he would be fur-
nished counsel if he could not afford one. Id. During questioning, Tucker stated that he had been with
a friend during the time of the alleged assault. Id. When police questioned Tucker's friend, the
friend's story actually served to implicate Tucker in the assault and rape. Id. at 436-37. Tucker tried
unsuccessfully to prevent his friend from testifying based on the fact that he had not received his full
Miranda warnings. Id. at 437.
144. Id. at 450.
145. Id. at 446.
146. 467 U.S. 649 (1984). A man with a gun was chased into a store by police. Id. at 652. After
a short chase, the police caught the man but found that the shoulder holster he was wearing was
empty. Id. Before the police advised him of his Miranda rights, they asked him where the gun was
located. Id. The suspect told the police where the gun was located. Id.
147. Id. at 655-56. The public safety exception to Miranda postulates that the safety of the public
takes preeminence over complying with the prophylactic rules of Miranda. Id. at 653. The Court
indicated that the police, in this case, had to "insure that further danger to the public did not result from
the concealment of the gun in a public area." Id. at 657.
148. Id. at 656.
149. Id. at 654 (quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
150. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
151. Id. at 318. Police arrived at the home of Elstad with a warrant for his arrest after he was
implicated in a residential burglary. Id. at 300. During conversation with the police, but prior to being
advised of his Miranda warnings, Elstad admitted to the burglary. Id. at 301. He was transported to
the sheriff's office and approximately one hour after their arrival, Elstad was first advised of his
Miranda rights. Id. After acknowledging and waiving his rights, Elstad gave a full confession. Id.
152. Id. at 318.
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also stated that a violation of Miranda was not an "actual infringement
of the suspect's constitutional rights."1 5
3
D. SUMMARY OF LEGAL BACKGROUND
The history of in-custody interrogations by police has been fraught
with incidents of police misconduct.1 54 Even though the past use of
physical brutality to obtain confessions may be the exception today, it is
still recognized that in-custody statements may also be obtained by the
use of psychological influences and as such are still presumed to be
coercive. 155 In order to protect against such presumptive coercion, the
United States Supreme Court in Miranda required the police to advise
suspects in police custody of certain rights and warnings before permit-
ting the use of any statements, taken from suspects, to be used in court as
evidence. 156
Recognizing that voluntary confessions would be presumed coerced
and therefore excluded as evidence if found to be in technical violation
of Miranda, Congress enacted 18 U.S.C. § 3501.157 Section 3501 pro-
vided Miranda type warnings and provisions; however, the absence or
presence of any of these warnings was not conclusive as to the voluntari-
ness of the statement. 158 It required the courts to look at the totality of
the circumstances surrounding the confession in order to determine its
voluntariness and hence, its admissibility as evidence.159 The Executive
Branch of the United States government independently determined that
§ 3501 was unconstitutional and refused to urge its application in the
courts. 160
III. ANALYSIS
Dickerson v. United States was decided by a seven-to-two majority,
which held that "Miranda and its progeny govern the admissibility of
statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal
courts." 161 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the majority opinion.162
153. Id. at 308.
154. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-47 (1966).
155. Id. at 448.
156. Id. at 444.
157. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act of 1968, Pub L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 210 (1968)
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994)).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Petitioner's Brief at 10, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2329-30 (2000) (No.
99-5525).
161. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2329-30.
162. Id. at 2329. Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the
opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist. Id.
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Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in which he attacked the majori-
ty's affirmation of Miranda, which Justice Scalia considered to be an
extraconstitutional constraint upon Congress and the states. 163
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
The majority addressed two issues: whether Congress had constitu-
tional authority to supersede Miranda and whether the Court had to
examine any other issues, other than those found in Miranda, to decide
this case. 164
1. Whether Congress Had Constitutional Authority to
Supersede Miranda
Since there was an apparent conflict between the holding of Miran-
da and 18 U.S.C. § 3501, the Court had to decide whether Congress had
constitutional authority to supersede Miranda.165 The issue turned on
the question of whether Miranda was a constitutional rule or a legislative
regulation of evidence. 166 The Court recognized that the implementa-
tion and enforcement of rules of evidence and procedure are left to
congressional discretion. 167 On the other hand, the Court emphasized
that interpreting and applying the Constitution remains ultimately with
the Court.168 Therefore, if Miranda were only a legislative rule, then
§ 3501 would be the determinative authority of whether a suspect's
confession may be admitted as evidence at trial. 169 If, on the other hand,
Miranda were a constitutional rule, then Congress would be precluded
from enacting any statute that superseded it.170
To support its contention that Miranda was a constitutional rule,
which could only be interpreted and applied by the Court, the majority
referred to the descriptive language and application of Miranda by the
Court. 17 1 Additionally, the Court referred to its invitation to the states to
163. Id. at 2348 (Scalia, J.,dissenting). Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia in the dissenting
opinion. Id.
164. Id. at 2335.
165. Id. at 2332.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 2332; see also Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 347-48 (1959) (showing that
Congress exercised its power in defining the rules surrounding the production of evidence in criminal
trials instead of leaving it to the courts).
168. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2332-33; see also City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997)
("Congress has been given the power to enforce, not the power to determine what constitutes a
constitutional violation.").
169. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2332.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2333-34.
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develop equally protective procedures, to demonstrate that Miranda was
a constitutional rule. 172
First, in reference to descriptive language, the Court pointed to the
Miranda Court's insistence that it give "concrete constitutional guide-
lines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." 173 In addition,
the Court mentioned the numerous statements in the Miranda decision
that demonstrated the intention to implement a "constitutional rule." 174
Therefore, the Court in Dickerson found it was the Miranda Court's
understanding that it was promulgating constitutional standards, which
would be applicable to all courts, both federal and state. 175
Secondly, in recognition of its limited authority over state courts in
addressing only constitutional issues, the Court demonstrated that Miran-
da was a constitutional issue by showing that the Miranda rule had been
applied to prosecutions arising in state courts. 176 If not addressing a
constitutional issue, the Court would have no supervisory authority over
a state court. 177
Furthermore, state prisoners had been permitted to raise alleged
Miranda violations in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 178 Federal
habeas corpus proceedings apply only to prisoners who are in custody
in violation of the federal Constitution or federal laws or treaties. 179
Since Miranda was not a federal law or treaty, the Court stated that its
172. Id.
173. Id. at 2333-34 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966)).
174. Id. at 2334 n.4. (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445). "The constitutional issue we decide in
each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in
custody .... " Miranda, 384 U.S. at 445. "The requirement of warnings and waiver of rights is ...
fundamental with respect to the Fifth Amendment privilege and not simply a preliminary ritual to
existing methods of interrogation." Id. at 476. "[T]he issues presented are of constitutional
dimensions and must be determined by the courts." Id. at 490.
175. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2334.
176. Id. at 2333; see also Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 326 (1994) (stating that the analy-
sis of the California Supreme Court conflicted with the precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court);
Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991) (stating that the authority of the Supreme Court in state
courts is limited to enforcing the federal Constitution).
177. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982) (stating that before a state conviction can be
overturned by a federal court, it must be determined that the state action violated a federal
constitutional right).
178. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 n.3; see also Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 102 (1995)
(holding that issues involving the definition of "custody" to determine whether a suspect is entitled to
Miranda are "mixed question[s] of law and fact" which require independent review); Withrow v.
Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 683 (1993) (holding that the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction extends to
a state prisoner's claim that his conviction was based on a violation of Miranda).
179. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1994).
The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain
an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.
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decision obviously assumed that it was a constitutional rule in order for
state prisoners to be permitted to raise alleged Miranda violations. 180
Finally, the Court called attention to the fact that Miranda recog-
nized that there might be alternatives for protecting a suspect's constitu-
tional privilege.181 It added that the Constitution would not preclude
Congress or the states from developing other procedures that were "at
least as effective" as the Miranda rights in protecting that privilege.182
When addressing constitutional issues applicable to the states, the Court
has consistently set the minimum constitutional requirements that the
states cannot go below in formulating its own rules or statutes. 183 There-
fore, by stipulating that Congress or the states could develop other pro-
cedures that were "at least as effective" as Miranda, there was an indica-
tion that the Court had set the minimum constitutional requirements
when it promulgated the Miranda rights.184
Addressing the issue of exceptions to the Miranda "exclusionary
rule" that the dissent raised, the Court emphasized that any modification
of the Miranda rule did not negate its constitutionality.1 85 The Court
pointed out that in addition to finding exceptions to the rule, it had also
"broadened" its application beyond that of in-custody confessions.186
The Court stated that the application of exceptions to, and the broaden-
ing of, the principles established in Miranda illustrated that "no consti-
tutional rule is immutable.' 187 The Court added that it would not be
possible for a court to foresee the various possibilities in which a consti-
tutional rule may be applied; therefore, modifications in the application
of the rule were "as much a normal part of constitutional law as the
original decision."1 88
The Court also recognized the amicus' contention that, in addition
to the Miranda exclusionary rule, there were other remedies available for
abusive police conduct. 189 The Court did not agree however, that these
180. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2333 n.3.
181. Id. at 2334 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467).
182. Id. at 2334.
183. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 273 (2000) (stating that there is an "established
practice, rooted in federalism, of allowing the States wide discretion, subject to the minimum
requirements of the 14th Amendment, to experiment with solutions to difficult problems of policy").
184. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2334.
185. Id. at 2334-35; see also supra Part II.C.2 (discussion on exclusionary rule exceptions).
186. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335; see also Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (holding that
the use for impeachment purposes of a suspect's silence, after arrest and being advised of Miranda
rights, was a violation of the Due Process Clause); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 677, 688 (1988)
(holding that after a suspect in custody has requested counsel, police may not question that suspect
about a separate investigation).
187. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
188. Id.
189. Id.; see also Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 28-40, Dickerson (No. 99-5525).
Examples of federal remedies include Bivens actions and claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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additional remedies supplemented the protections found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3501 enough to "meet the constitutional minimum" found in Miran-
da.190 Miranda required certain procedures that would ensure that an
in-custody suspect was warned that he or she had a right to remain silent
and a right to counsel prior to any questioning.191 Coupling the addi-
tional remedies identified by amici192 with § 3501, which only required
an examination of the totality of the circumstances, would not provide
the necessary minimal protections required by Miranda.193
2. The Court Only Examined Issues Found in Miranda
Even though the Court recognized that there were various other
contentions raised by amici, it declined to look any further than Miran-
da, due to the "procedural posture" of this particular case. 194 In other
words, since the petitioners had not raised the arguments addressed by
the amici, the Court was reluctant to examine them. 195
The Court emphasized that § 3501 reinstated the "totality of the
circumstances" test, a test which the Court rejected in Miranda.196 In
fact, the Miranda Court stated that something more than the "totality
test" was necessary for the protection of a constitutional privilege. 197
Therefore, § 3501 was not sufficient as an "equivalent" to the Miranda
warnings to ensure that required protection.198
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (holding that a violation of the Fourth
Amendment by federal agents, under the color of law, gives rise to a cause of action); 28 U.S.C. §
2680(h) (1994) (applying to acts or omissions of federal agents arising "out of claims of assault,
battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution"); 18 U.S.C. §§
241, 242 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (prohibiting the deprivation of a subject's constitutional rights under
the color of law). Examples of state remedies include § 1983 actions and state tort suits. See 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (permitting suits against state officers who, acting under color
of law, deprive a citizen of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution).
190. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
191. Id.
192. Supra note 189.
193. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
194. Id. at 2337 n.8; see also Brief of Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae at 45-48, Dickerson (No.
99-5525). An example of one of the other contentions which had been raised by the amici involved
the issue of the "irrebuttable presumption" which results when there is a failure to administer the
Miranda warnings. Id. The amici argued that such a presumption disappeared when the "application
of the presumption does not reach the correct result most of the time." Id. They added that to apply
the irrebuttable presumption was to change the standard of the Fifth Amendment from compulsion to
warning-and-waiver, which redefined the state's legal obligation. Id. This problem, the amici
contended, could be resolved if the Court changed the irrebuttable presumption into a rebuttable one,
meaning that a statement would be presumed to be involuntary until the state could prove otherwise.
Id. This would place the burden on the government to prove voluntariness while continuing to keep
Miranda as an important part of the equation. Id.
195. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2337; see also Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 370 (1960)
(stating that since an argument was not advanced by the petitioners, the Court had no reason to pass
upon it).
196. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457.
197. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467,490-91.
198. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2335.
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The Court concluded that even if it did not agree with the Miranda
decision, the principles of stare decisis would prevent the Court from
overruling it now. 199 Even if the Court were to depart from Miranda,
any departure of precedent must be supported by special justification. 200
Since Miranda had become so much a part of routine police practice in
the United States, it had actually become part of the national culture. 201
As a result, the Court saw no justification to overrule Miranda.202
B. JUSTICE SCALIA'S DISSENT
Justice Scalia dissented because, in his opinion, Miranda placed
constraints upon Congress and the states that were outside the reach of
the Constitution. 203 He pointed out that the Court refused to clearly state
in its opinion that the use of § 3501 or the failure to give the Miranda
warnings violated the Constitution. 204 The reason for this, Justice Scalia
contended, was that not only did § 3501 exclude exactly what the Consti-
tution excluded, confessions obtained by coercion, but also, three of the
Justices joining the majority opinion had gone on record as believing
that a violation of Miranda was not a violation of the Constitution. 205
Therefore, in order to justify its decision in this case, the Court had to
form an entirely new principle of constitutional law. 206 That new princi-
pal prohibited Congress from enacting legislation that not only violated
the Constitution but also any other decision of the Court.207
According to Justice Scalia, for over seventy years the Court had
rejected the premise that confessions obtained as a result of in-custody
199. Id. at 2336. To support this decision, the Court referred to the 1980 case of Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 304 (Burger, C.J.) ("The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and
law enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage
it, nor extend it at this late date.").
200. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336; see also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (stating
that in constitutional cases, the doctrine carries such persuasive force that we have always required a
departure from precedent to be supported by some special justification).
201. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336; see also Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 330 (1999)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the "wide acceptance in our legal culture" of a rule is "adequate
reason not to overrule" it).
202. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
203. Id. at 2348. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia in the dissenting opinion. Id. at 2337.
204. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2337.
205. See id. (citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 457 (1994), and stating that Miranda is a
series of recommended safeguards which are not constitutionally protected); Duckworth v. Eagan,
492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (stating that Miranda rights are not rights protected by the Constitution); Ore-
gon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985) (stating that a failure to administer Miranda warnings does not
result in the same consequences as an infringement of a constitutional right); New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (stating that the prophylactic Miranda warnings are not rights protected by
the Constitution).




interrogations were coerced. 208 The only "conceivable basis" for the
Miranda decision, Justice Scalia surmised, was to prevent "foolish rather
than compelled confessions" by the suspect. 209 This was the only ex-
planation for the Court to include the right to counsel and the require-
ment that this right be knowingly and intelligently waived. 210 As Justice
Scalia reasoned, it was not necessary that counsel tell the suspect to
remain silent, the police interrogator already tells the suspect that.2
11 It
was this apparent and open hostility toward confessions per se that made
the Miranda decision so unacceptable. 212
In addressing the exceptions to Miranda's exclusionary rule, Justice
Scalia examined four cases, which, according to him, clearly demonstrat-
ed that the Court had concluded that a violation of Miranda was not
necessarily a violation of the Constitution. 213 Justice Scalia pointed out
that had the statement in Tucker been taken by police in violation of the
Fifth Amendment, that statement and its "fruits" would have been
excluded as evidence. 214 Justice Scalia also indicated that the holding in
Hass recognized that a violation of Miranda was not "unconstitutional
compulsion" since statements taken in actual violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege could not be used in a criminal trial, including its
use as impeachment evidence. 2 15 Justice Scalia emphasized that the
Quarles court was aware that if the Miranda warnings were required by
the Fifth Amendment, no public safety exception would have been
possible as the bar on self-incrimination is absolute. 216 Justice Scalia
then indicated that the Court in Elstad made the statement to the effect
208. Id. at 2339; see also Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 437 (1958) (stating that police
detention and examination of a suspect does not render a confession involuntary); Powers v. United
States, 223 U.S. 303, 313-14 (1912) (stating that voluntary confessions are admissible at trial); Wilson
v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623-24 (1896) (stating that the fact that a suspect is in custody does not
render his confession involuntary).
209. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2339.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. See id. (quoting from United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977), "[Far from
being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently
desirable.").
213. See Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2340-41 (discussing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318
(1985), which permits the admission of a suspect's statement even though it was preceded by an
earlier statement taken without the advisement of the Miranda warnings); see also New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (creating a public safety exception to the Miranda exclusionary
rule); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 723-24 (1975) (holding that a voluntary statement taken in
violation of Miranda could be used at trial for impeachment purposes); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
433, 439 (1974) (holding that the identity of a witness by the statement of an in-custody defendant was
not the "fruit" of a Miranda violation).
214. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2341; see also Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 (1984) (stating
that exclusion of evidence under the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is applicable to Fifth
Amendment violations).
215. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2341.
216. Id.
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that police who fail to provide the Miranda warnings should not reap
the same consequences as if they had violated a Fifth Amendment
privilege. 217
In light of the four "exception" cases, Justice Scalia stated that it
was not possible for the Court to come to the conclusion that a violation
of Miranda was a violation of the Constitution. 218 However, Justice
Scalia believed that the Court must come to this conclusion before it
could strike down a statute of Congress that governs the admissibility of
evidence in federal courts. 219 Justice Scalia stated that, in order to avoid
such a conclusion, the Court provided two explanations for the findings
in these cases. 220
The first was that there was "some language" or dicta in these post-
Miranda cases that did "indicate" that the Miranda warnings were not
constitutionally mandated. 221 Justice Scalia emphasized that it was more
than just dicta; that this "some language" was central to the holdings of
Tucker, Hass, Quarles, and Elstad that a violation of Miranda was not a
violation of the Constitution. 222
The second explanation made by the Court was that "no constitu-
tional rule is immutable." 223 The Court reasoned that no court can
foresee all of the ways by which a law may be applied by counsel. 224
Justice Scalia recognized this fact; however, he argued that when rules
are modified they still must make sense. 225 He emphasized this by
stating that if confessions obtained in violation of Miranda were, in fact,
violations of the Constitution, then the findings of these post-Miranda
cases made no sense as they too involved confessions obtained in viola-
tion of Miranda.226 Justice Scalia's conclusion then was that the only
reasonable explanation for the findings of these post-Miranda cases was
that a violation of Miranda was not a violation of the Constitution. 227
Justice Scalia also discussed the Court's assertion that Miranda must
be a constitutional rule because it has been applied to the states.228 He
217. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-09; see also Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. 2341.
218. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2342.
219. Id. Justice Scalia added that the Court was violating the very principles of the separation of






225. Id. Justice Scalia reasoned that to deem otherwise would render the Court a "nine-headed




228. Id. at 2343. Justice Scalia indicated that to continually apply Miranda to the states despite
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explained that if this was an "invocation of stare decisis," it must fail. 229
This was because, whether or not it was determined that Miranda was
required by the Constitution, the post-Miranda exception cases clearly
demonstrated that there were cases on both sides of the issue that would
need to be reconsidered. 230 Therefore, "the stare decisis argument is a
wash."
2 3 1
Even though § 3501 dealt exclusively with the totality-of-the-
circumstances test, Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court's decision
had not "banished" this test from the law. 232 When a court examines
any challenge to an in-custody statement, it undertakes both a Miranda
and a voluntariness examination. 233 This is because the voluntariness in-
quiry remains the constitutional standard that governs the admissibility
of evidence in situations involving impeachment, "fruits of the poison-
ous tree," and statements claimed to be taken unconstitutionally in spite
of the fact that Miranda warnings were given.234
Justice Scalia concluded that the Court, in determining that Miranda
is a constitutional rule, did not merely apply the Constitution, it expand-
ed it.235 Justice Scalia called this a "frightening antidemocratic power"
which does not exist. 236 Therefore, in denying the effect of § 3501, the
Court was in "plain violation" of the United States Constitution. 237
IV. IMPACT
Dickerson affirmed that a failure to advise a subject, who is in police
custody, of his or her Miranda rights precludes the use of any statements
obtained.238 The underlying purpose of the Miranda exclusionary rule
is to deter the use of coercion, inherent in custodial interrogations, which
prevents individuals from exercising their Fifth Amendment privilege
not to incriminate themselves. 239
the Court's statements that a violation of its dictates is not an actual constitutional violation, is evidence




232. Id. at 2347.
233. Id.
234. Id. Justice Scalia added that in reference to its application, the totality of the circumstances
test is no more difficult to apply than Miranda. Id. In fact, Justice Scalia agreed with a previous
dissent written by Justice O'Connor who stated that the "voluntariness inquiry often can make judicial
decisionmaking easier rather than more onerous." Id. (quoting Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680,
711-12 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
235. Id. at 2337.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 2338.
238. Id. at 2329; see also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961) (finding evidence inadmissible
if obtained in violation of the Constitution).
239. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 439 (1966).
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Even though the Miranda exclusionary rule appears to have a valid
constitutional purpose, there are easily recognizable disadvantages to its
application. 240 The first is that the Miranda exclusionary rule "sweeps
more broadly" than the Fifth Amendment itself in that it may be applied
even when there is no violation of a Fifth Amendment privilege.24 1 This
would be the case where a non-coerced statement was given voluntarily
by a suspect, but the officer failed to advise the suspect of the Miranda
warnings prior to the giving of such statement. 242
By failing to administer the Miranda warnings prior to receiving a
statement, there is a presumption that any subsequent confession was
compelled. 243 As such, the Fifth Amendment precludes a prosecutor
from using presumably compelled testimony in his or her case-in-
chief.244 Therefore, even though a suspect may provide an otherwise
voluntary statement, with no resulting constitutional harm, the failure to
provide the Miranda warnings would preclude the use of such a state-
ment. 245 In summary, a failure to provide the Miranda warnings "does
not constitute coercion but rather affords a bright-line, legal presump-
tion of coercion, requiring suppression of all unwamed statements." 246
A second disadvantage, which was recognized by the Court, is that a
voluntary statement made by a subject, who may be well aware of his
Miranda rights, would still be excluded if he were not properly given the
warnings. 247 Even though Miranda has become firmly implanted in our
national culture to the point of being commonly known, an in-custody
suspect must still be advised of such warnings. 248 The Court conceded
that a failure to advise of these warnings could likely result in a guilty
defendant being set free.24 9
A third disadvantage is that, historically, the Court has had difficulty
in defining terms which are necessary in determining when the Miranda
warnings should be given.250 Twenty-eight years after the Miranda deci-
sion, the Court still had to address this definition issue in Stansbury v.
240. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
241. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985).
242. Id. at 307.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 306-07.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 307 n.1.
247. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000); see also Michigan v. Harvey, 494
U.S. 344, 350 (1990) (recognizing that the Miranda rules would result in the exclusion of some
voluntary and reliable statements).
248. Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2336.
249. Id. at 2326.
250. Brief of Amicus Curiae Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez at 4, Dickerson v.
United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
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California,251 where even the Supreme Court of California had difficulty
in defining the concept of custody.252 The Court itself has admitted that
"the task of defining custody is a slippery one." 25
3
The Court's difficulty with definitions is also found with the term
"interrogation" 254 A case demonstrating the Court's obvious difficulty
with this term is found in Pennsylvania v. Muniz,255 where there were six
different opinions regarding the definition of "interrogation" of a
drunk driver.256
Finally, a fourth difficulty arises when police administer the Miran-
da warnings, obtain a valid confession, and then are later informed by
the courts that there was a breach of Miranda due to such things as a re-
definition of a term as discussed above.257 As the Court stated in Elstad,
police are not trained to act as counsel, determining the diffi-
cult question of when custody begins. 258 The police can only
be expected to adhere to the current decisions of the Court,
which may provide some direction in defining such terms as
custody, even though the courts themselves seem to have
difficulty in accomplishing this task.259
In recognition of the inherent difficulties associated with the
application of Miranda, police officers cannot realistically be expected
to make no errors. 260 When nonculpable errors are made in the
administration of the Miranda rights, it should not result in the same
consequences as an intentional violation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege. 261 To do so could compromise the confidence that the public
251. 511 U.S. 318 (1994).
252. Id. at 319 (holding that the subjective interpretation of an officer on whether a person being
interrogated is a suspect does not figure into the determination of defining custody).
253. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
254. Brief of Amicus Curiae Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Rarnirez at 4, Dickerson (No.
99-5525).
255. 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
256. Id. The differences of opinion as to the definition of interrogation included a five-to-four
split involving the questioning of the defendant as to the date of his sixth birthday, an eight-to-one split
as to statements given by the defendant during a sobriety test, an eight-to-one split as to statements
made by the defendant when asked to submit to a breathalyzer test, and an inability of the Justices to
agree as to responses made by the defendant to certain booking questions. Id.
257. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316 (citing United States v. Bowler, 561 F.2d 1323, 1324 (9th Cir.
1977), where the trial court suppressed a statement made prior to administration of Miranda
warnings); United States v. Total, 536 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1976) (showing that a confession can be
deemed inadmissible, even when the Miranda warnings have been given, due to the length of the
in-custody interrogation); United States v. Knight, 395 F.2d 971, 974-75 (2d Cir. 1968) (examining the
admissibility of a confession based upon the custody of a suspect by two separate police agencies).
258. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 316.
259. Brief of Amicus Curiae Manning & Marder, Kass, Ellrod, Ramirez 3-4, Dickerson v. United
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525).
260. ELstad, 470 U.S. at 308-09.
261. Id.
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has in the appropriateness of the exclusionary sanction, just as an "over-
criminalization" sanction can do.262 It may ultimately result in
"disrespect for the law and the administration of justice." 2 63
A potential solution to dissipate the disadvantages associated with
the Miranda exclusionary rule would be to extend and apply the "good
faith" exception, which is normally applicable to Fourth Amendment
search and seizure concerns.264 The government, which supported the
affirmation of Miranda, intimated that such an exception might be
appropriate when an officer makes a "reasonable" mistake in comply-
ing with the dictates of Miranda.265
Embodied in the relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ment is the uniform underlying purpose of each amendment's exclusion-
ary rule-to deter police misconduct. 266  However, when the police
action has been taken in objective good faith or in a reasonable belief
that such conduct has not violated a right, it is incorrect to assume that
adherence to such an exclusionary rule will continue to provide deter-
rence. 267 This is because the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
is to prohibit the deprivation of a constitutional right by willful, or at
least negligent, police conduct. 268 Where police action is taken in
objective good faith, the deterrence rationale loses it purpose.269
Regarding the exclusion of potentially useful evidence, the Court
has recognized that it must be sensitive to the costs and benefits of the
imposition of the exclusionary rule.270 While a defendant may reap the
benefit from an exclusion, the primary cost is that exclusion interferes
with a trial court's truth-seeking function "by barring relevant and trust-
262. Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion-A Price or Sanction?, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1275,
1319-20 (2000).
263. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 908 (1984) (stating that in instances where law enforce-
ment officers have acted in good faith, the use of the exclusionary rule bestows such a large benefit
upon the guilty defendant that it offends the "basic concepts of the criminal justice system").
264. Id. at 900, 920-21. The Court determined that a "good faith" exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment's exclusionary rule involves a law enforcement officer who, acting in objective good faith,
obtains a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acts within the scope of that warrant. Id. at
920. Since there would be no illegality, the exclusionary rule's deterrence objective would not apply.
Id. at 920-21.
265. Brief for the United States at 36 nn.25 & 26, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326
(2000) (No. 99-5525).
266. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 260 (1983) (showing that the deterrent purpose of the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule rests upon the assumption that the police have either willfully or negli-
gently deprived a subject of a constitutional right); see also Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (stating that the inten-
tion of the exclusionary rule is not to cure the invasion of a right, but to create a judicial remedy
through the deterrent effect); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974) (showing the deterrent
purpose of the Miranda Fifth Amendment exclusionary rule).
267. Gates, 462 U.S. at 260.
268. Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447.
269. Id.
270. Gates; 462 U.S. at 257.
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worthy evidence." 271 Such a cost has been a source of concern for the
Court for quite some time.272 Since such a rule prevents a jury from
having the ability to review evidence, its application must be justified and
limited to situations that will in fact deter misconduct.273 As the Court
has stated, it is difficult to justify the exclusion of highly probative evi-
dence obtained from a voluntary statement which will be "irretrievably
lost to the factfinder." 274
Over the years the Court has recognized the importance of such
probative evidence in relation to its reduced deterrent effect, and has
fashioned certain exceptions to its exclusionary rules.275 Several of these
exceptions have been applicable to both Fourth and Fifth Amendment
concerns. 276
Since the Court has now affirmed, however, that a failure to provide
Miranda warnings is a presumption of coercion resulting in the exclu-
sion of evidence, it is reasonable to assume that a good faith effort to
comply with its dictates should also be permitted an exception. 277 To
say otherwise would require the exclusionary rule to be applied on a
"strict liability basis," which precludes the use of all exceptions. 278 The
extension of the "good faith" exception to the Miranda exclusionary
rule would simultaneously applaud an officer's good faith effort in
obtaining a valid, voluntary confession while still emphasizing that
wrongful police conduct will not be tolerated. 279
A. APPLICATION TO NORTH DAKOTA
North Dakota has recognized that evidence obtained in violation of
constitutional mandates precludes the use of that evidence at trial.280
Even though the North Dakota Supreme Court has applied the "good
271. Id.
272. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984).
273. Gates, 462 U.S. at 257-58.
274. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 312 (1985).
275. Gates, 462 U.S. at 256.
276. Id. at 256-57. The Court has permitted the use of illegally obtained evidence for impeach-
ment purposes. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-28 (1980) (discussing Fourth Amend-
ment application); see also Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 224-26 (1971) (discussing Fifth
Amendment application). The Court has also allowed subsequent evidence, which had been obtained
initially from an illegal source, to be introduced at trial. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300, 318 (discussing
Fifth Amendment application).
277. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309 (stating that an error by police in administering the Miranda warn-
ings should not result in the same consequences as a direct violation of a Fifth Amendment privilege).
278. Davies, supra note 262, at 1330 (indicating that "the good faith exception ensures that the ex-
clusion sanction will not be applied on a strict liability basis"); see also Dickerson v. United States, 120
S. Ct. 2326, 2341 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding that if the Miranda warnings were required by
the Fifth Amendment, exceptions would not be possible because the "bar on compelled self-
incrimination is absolute").
279. Davies, supra note 262, at 1330.
280. City of Jamestown v. Dardis, 2000 ND 186, 1 19, 618 N.W.2d 495.
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faith" exception to violations of a state statute, 281 it has nevertheless
declined to decide whether the North Dakota Constitution precludes a
"good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule involving search and
seizure concerns. 282 Therefore, the entire issue of a good faith excep-
tion, as it relates to any constitutional concern, remains unresolved.283
B. SURVEY
In order to gauge the impressions of North Dakota criminal attor-
neys as they relate to the issues involving Miranda, the exclusionary rule,
and the good faith exception, I chose to conduct a non-scientific survey.
Prosecutors and criminal defense attorneys from nine representative
counties within North Dakota were randomly selected to receive the
survey.2 84 These counties contain some of the state's largest populated
areas and would, per capita, have a higher crime rate. A higher crime
rate would produce significantly more situations where Miranda, the
exclusionary rule, and the good faith exception would apply. Hence, the
attorneys in these areas would be more familiar with these issues.
The survey, which was mailed to each volunteer participant, consist-
ed of a total of eight questions, including seven multiple-choice ques-
tions after an initial question identifying what type of criminal work the
participants were involved in prosecution or defense. The survey also
contained space for additional comments. 285 Of the eighteen surveys
sent out, fifteen were completed and returned. 286
In question number twO, 287 participants were asked if the mandatory
use of Miranda by law enforcement had made their job easier. Fifty
percent of the prosecutors and forty-three percent of the defense attor-
neys answered affirmatively. 288 One prosecutor did indicate that many
281. State v. Herrick, 1999 ND 1, 28, 588 N.W.2d 847, 852.
282. Id. 27; see also Christopher Paul Fischer, Comment, "I Hear You Knocking But You Can't
Come In": The North Dakota Supreme Court Again Declines To Decide Whether The State
Constitution Precludes A Good Faith Exception To The Exclusionary Rule, 76 N.D. L. REV. 123, 157
(2000).
283. See Fischer, supra note 282, at 159 (concluding that the issue of the good faith exception
involving violations of the state constitution "remains an open question").
284. These representative counties were: Burleigh, Cass, Grand Forks, Morton, Ramsey, Rich-
land, Stark, Ward, and Williams. Prior to sending the surveys I contacted, by telephone, the office of
twelve prosecutors and nine defense attorneys in order to solicit their cooperation. One prosecutor did
not return my call, one defense attorney declined to participate, and another defense attorney was
unavailable to respond. A total of eighteen surveys were eventually sent out, eleven to prosecutors
and seven to defense attorneys.
285. In completing the survey, the attorneys had the option of either permitting their name to be
used or not. For those who declined, neither their names nor work locations were disclosed in this
case comment.
286. Of the 15 completed and returned surveys, eight were from prosecutors and seven were
from defense attorneys.
287. "Has the mandatory use of Miranda rights by law enforcement made your job easier?"
288. Four of the eight prosecutors, or 50%, indicated that the mandatory use of Miranda had
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suspects will make frivolous challenges to the properly given warnings
when they realize that their statements are going to be used against
them. 289 Interestingly, twenty-five percent of the prosecutors and four-
teen percent of the defense attorneys did not know if it made a
difference at all. 290 Criminal defense attorney Don Campbell of Minot,
who stated that the use of Miranda did not make his job easier, explained
that ninety-nine percent of the defendants he has represented had
voluntarily submitted themselves to law enforcement interrogation prior
to his representation. 291
Question number three 292 asked if the attorneys believed that law
enforcement, for the most part, were properly applying Miranda as re-
quired by the courts. All of the prosecutors surveyed stated that they
believed they were, while only fifty-seven percent of the defense attor-
neys answered affirmatively. 293 One defense attorney indicated in his
response that federal law enforcement agents properly apply the warn-
ings while it is a "hit and miss" situation with state or local officers. 294
An opinion contrary to this was given by Grand Forks County Assistant
State's Attorney Warren Johnson, who stated that he found officers
were more likely to overuse Miranda, even when it was not legally
necessary. 295
In the fourth question, 296 attorneys were asked whether the appli-
cation of Miranda should be tightened, loosened, or stay the same.
Seventy-five percent of prosecutors indicated that it should stay the same
while twenty-five percent of the same group indicated that it should be
loosened. 297 In his response, Morton County State's Attorney Allen
Koppy, expressing a view shared by Chief Justice Rehnquist, 298 stated
made their job easier, while three of the seven defense attorneys, or 43%, indicated the same.
289. Anonymous Survey Response "A" (Feb. 2, 2001) (on file with author).
290. Two of the eight prosecutors, or 25%, indicated that they did not know if the mandatory use
of Miranda by law enforcement made their job easier, while one of the seven defense attorneys, or
14%, indicated the same response.
291. Response to Survey by Don Campbell, defense attorney in Ward County, N.D. (Jan. 25,
2001) (on file with author).
292. "Do you believe law enforcement, for the most part, is properly applying the Miranda rights
as required by the courts?"
293. All eight of the prosecutors surveyed indicated that they believed law enforcement was
properly applying Miranda, while four of the seven defense attorneys, or 57%, indicated the same
response.
294, Anonymous Survey Response "B" (Feb. 1, 2001) (on file with author).
295. Response to Survey by Warren Johnson, prosecutor in Grand Forks County N.D. (Jan. 24,
2001) (on file with author).
296. "Do you believe that the application of Miranda rights by law enforcement should be
tightened, loosened, or stay the same?"
297. Six of the eight prosecutors, or 75%, indicated that the application of the Miranda rights by
law enforcement should stay the same, while two of the eight prosecutors, or 25%, indicated that it
should be loosened.
298. See Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2336 (2000) (reasoning that "Miranda has
become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of our
national culture.").
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that Miranda has become so much a part of our national legal culture
that it should not be changed, it should stay the same. 299 Of the defense
attorneys, only forty-three percent stated that it should stay the same,
while fifty-seven percent indicated that it should be tightened. 300
Question five 301 asked the attorneys if the current use of Miranda
hindered law enforcement in effectively performing their jobs. All of
the defense attorneys indicated that it was not a hindrance, while only
thirty-eight percent of the prosecutors felt that it was. 302 One prosecutor
indicated that a major problem exists in dealing with juvenile crimi-
nals. 303 Since North Dakota law prohibits law enforcement from speak-
ing to juveniles unless a parent or attorney is present, regardless of
whether Miranda is given, statements are normally not taken from
juveniles. 304 This is especially true when the juvenile criminals are runa-
ways and there is not immediate access to a parent or guardian. 305 This
prosecutor concluded that this tended to be a major hindrance to law
enforcement when attempting to investigate juvenile crime.306
Question six307 asked if the attorneys supported the use of the
exclusionary rule in preventing the admissibility of evidence illegally
obtained by law enforcement. All of the defense attorneys indicated that
they did support the rule while seventy-five percent of the prosecutors
indicated the same.3 08 One prosecutor stated that, while at a seminar, an
FBI instructor asked them that if the purpose of the exclusionary rule is
to prevent the police from acting unconstitutionally, what purpose does it
serve if the police think or feel that they are acting within the Consti-
tution? 309 This prosecutor added that when lawyers and judges disagree
299. Response to Survey by Allen Koppy, Morton County N.D. State's Attorney (Feb. 10, 2001)
(on file with author).
300. Three of the seven defense attorneys, or 43%, indicated that the application of Miranda by
law enforcement should stay the same, while four of the seven defense attorneys, or 57%, indicated
that it should be tightened.
301. "Do you believe that the current use of Miranda rights 'hinders' law enforcement in
effectively performing their jobs?"
302. All of the seven defense attorneys surveyed indicated that the current use of Miranda did
not hinder law enforcement in performing their jobs, while three of the eight prosecutors, or 38%,
indicated that it was not a hindrance.
303. Anonymous Survey Response "C" (Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with author).
304. In re D.S., 263 N.W.2d 114, 120 (N.D. 1978) (indicating that in any type of proceeding a
juvenile must be represented by either a parent, guardian, custodian, or counsel); see also N.D. CENT.
CODE § 27-20-26(1) (1991 & Supp. 1999).
305. See D.S., 263 N.W.2d at 120 (concluding that a child not represented by parent, guardian,
or counsel cannot waive right to counsel).
306. Anonymous Survey Response "C" (Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with author).
307. "Do you support the use of the 'exclusionary rule' in preventing the admissibility of
evidence illegally obtained by law enforcement?"
308. All of the seven defense attorneys surveyed indicated that they support the use of the
exclusionary rule, while six of the eight prosecutors, or 75%, indicated their support of it.
309. Anonymous Survey Response "C" (Jan. 25, 2001) (on file with author).
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or have trouble understanding what is proper, how can one expect a law
enforcement officer to know any better?310
The seventh question 31 1 asked if the attorneys supported the use of
the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule. A majority of
both prosecutors and defense attorneys supported such an exception.
Eighty-seven percent of the prosecutors stated that they supported it
while fifty-seven percent of the defense attorneys indicated the same
response. 312 One defense attorney, who does not support exclusion,
expressed his concern that if law enforcement officers cannot follow the
law, they lose the respect that they should receive from the public.313
The eighth and final question 314 asked the attorneys if they would
support the "good faith" exception as applied to voluntary confessions
obtained by law enforcement in "technical" violation of Miranda, yet
done in "good faith." Seventy-five percent of the prosecutors surveyed
supported such an extension of the "good faith" exception while
eighty-six percent of the defense attorneys opposed the idea. 315 Defense
attorney Kerry Rosenquist of Larimore stated that the "good faith"
exception to Miranda is a "slippery slope" remedy. 316 He added that a
rule without boundaries is not a rule that can be followed without error,
but it can easily be abused.317 Grand Forks County Assistant State's
Attorney Warren Johnson indicated however, that he supports such an
exception, but that each application of the exception would need to be
examined on a case-by-case basis within our adversary system of
justice. 318
As a final note to this survey, I combined the responses from both
the prosecution and defense attorneys for the final question.319 I discov-
ered that they were split fairly evenly: fifty-three percent of all attorneys
310. Id.
311. "Do you support the use of the 'good faith exception' to the exclusionary rule?"
312. Seven of the eight prosecutors, or 87%, indicated that they supported the use of the "good
faith exception" to the exclusionary rule, while four of the seven defense attorneys, or 57%, indicated
that they support it.
313. Anonymous Survey Response "B" (Feb. 1, 2001) (on file with author).
314. "Would you support the extension of the 'good faith exception' to voluntary confessions
obtained by law enforcement when the confessions were obtained in 'technical/ violation of Miranda,
yet done in 'good faith'?"
315. Six of the eight prosecutors, or 75%, indicated their support for the extension of the good
faith exception to technical violations of Miranda, while six of the seven defense attorneys, or 86%,
opposed it.
316. Response to Survey by Kerry Rosenquist, defense attorney in Grand Forks County, N.D.
(Jan. 24, 2001) (on file with author).
317. Id.
318. Response to Survey by Warren Johnson, prosecutor in Grand Forks County, N.D. (Jan. 24,
2001) (on file with author).
319. Instead of viewing the results separately in the prosecutor and defense attorney categories,
I looked at the total "yes" responses versus the total "no" responses to determine the overall support
for the extension of the "good faith exception" to technical violations of Miranda.
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surveyed opposed the idea of extending the "good faith" exception to
Miranda, while forty-seven percent supported such an extension. 320
Overall, this small, unscientific survey seems to indicate that for the
most part, criminal attorneys in North Dakota largely support the use of
Miranda, the exclusionary rule, and the "good faith" exception to that
rule as applied to the Fourth Amendment. Differences emerge however
when the question is raised about extending the application of the
"good faith" exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule. Since it
appears that these differences are almost evenly split, there is the real
possibility that it may be only a matter of time before this issue is
directly addressed in the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
In Dickerson, the United States Supreme Court held that Miranda
was a constitutional decision and could not be overruled by an act of
Congress. 321 Therefore, Miranda governs the admissibility of statements
taken from subjects while in police custody in both federal and state
courts. 322 If the United States Supreme Court recognizes a "good
faith" exception to the Miranda exclusionary rule, the North Dakota
Supreme Court could then be forced to examine, and finally resolve,
their constitutional "good faith" issue.
Gene A. Pearce*
320. Of the 15 attorneys who responded to the survey, eight of the 15, or 53%, opposed the
extension of the "good faith exception" to technical violations of Miranda, while seven of the 15, or
47%, supported the idea.
321. Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 2329 (2000).
322. Id.
* First and foremost, I would like to thank my wife, Denise, for her continual patience, support
and encouragement. I would also like to thank my parents for always being there for me.
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